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(IBPP Note: This is the final part of a three-part series by Mr. Todd Leventhal, who from January 1987 to
May 1996 was Program Officer for Countering Disinformation at the United States Information Agency
(USIA.) The first two parts have contained examples of perception management operations, often
against USG interests. The series has reflected his personal opinion, not those of USIA or the US
Government (USG.) It has been presented with only the most minor editing.)
Lessons for USG Policymakers
A number of state and non-state actors have a professional disinformation/perception management
(PM) apparatus, which they employ as an integral part of their foreign and national security policies.
These states include (1) communist regimes such as China, North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam; (2) former
communist regimes such as Russia, some entities of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and
many of the successor states of former Yugoslavia; (3) fringe group extremists and conspiracy theorists
in the West, such as the Lyndon LaRouche organization.
A common denominator for many of these groups is that they use Soviet-style methods, often having
been trained by the Soviets. Somalia's General Aideed received military training in Italy and the Soviet
Union and may have learned PM techniques from the Soviets. The historically close Soviet-Iraqi
relationship extended to cooperation in the area of intelligence and may well have included training in
PM techniques. Successor states to communist regimes have inherited bureaucracies schooled in these
techniques.
Indeed, there is no indication that the Russian government's intelligence services have abandoned their
commitment to PM techniques. On the contrary, they appear to be devoting roughly as much resources
as the KGB did to this mission.
Russia is not likely to engage in any significant amount of overtly anti-American disinformation in the
near future, however. This would not help achieve Russian goals. But it is a virtual certainty that the
Russians, who are the world's most accomplished professionals in PM operations, will use every tool at
their disposal to influence the perceptions of Americans and others in a way that will serve to enhance
Russian national interests.
During the Gorbachev era, the Soviets developed a sophisticated series of conciliatory and alarmist PM
techniques that--despite their conciliatory nature--were designed to work to the detriment of the USG.
The continued publication of "Intelligence Newsletter" and the Kazakh nuclear weapons campaign (IBPP,
V.1, No. 6) are indications that these techniques are continuing--a subject that needs to be analyzed
carefully in the West.
Organizing to Analyze and Counter the Threat
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In retrospect, the Achilles heel of the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG)--the USG apparatus for
tracking, analyzing, and countering foreign PM techniques during the 1980s--was its too narrow focus on
the Soviet Union. At one point, during the late 1980s, one of the member agencies of the AMWG began
to develop substantial expertise on PM techniques employed by other regimes, such as Libya and China.
But the unit that had begun to accumulate this knowledge and expertise was completely reoriented in
1990 and ceased to monitor PM operations. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the AMWG's
activities atrophied dramatically shortly afterwards because its seemingly sole raison d'etre had
disappeared.
The AMWG survived as a bureaucratic entity and in 1995 changed its name to the Perception
Management Working Group (PMWG.) It played a minimally useful role, but remained severely
hampered because no agency in the national security, foreign affairs, defense, or intelligence
communities--with the sole exception of USIA, which was necessarily only a bit player in this arena--any
longer employed individuals who devoted themselves full-time to the task of countering foreign PM
operations. Finally, in June 1996, even the vestigial PMWG was abolished, leaving the USG with no
institutional capability to track, analyze, and counter foreign PM activities.
This remains a serious oversight that poses a significant threat to US interests. As the information age
expands and the world implodes, the opportunities for unscrupulous regimes and actors to manipulate
information in an attempt to distort perceptions and skew policy will only increase. The USG needs a
capability to deal with this threat, and that capability will only materialize when the agencies in the
national security, foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence communities devote significant resources to
it.
The USG bureaucratic structure for dealing with post-Cold War PM threats must differ from what was
appropriate for the Cold War if it is to accomplish its purposes. Prior to 1992, the Soviet disinformation
apparatus was the 800-pound gorilla in this business. Its steady stream of anti-American invective made
it possible, in many cases, to simply wait for the inevitable onslaught of untruths. Then one simply
needed to be well-schooled in Soviet techniques and ready to react quickly to the latest variations on
usually predictable themes. Such a situation placed a premium on Soviet area specialization.
In the post-Cold War era, the PM threats are more varied, obscure, and subtle. They require roving
analysts with functional expertise willing to plunge into different, unfamiliar situations on a serial, ad
hoc basis, bringing the added value of their functional knowledge to a succession of initially
bewilderingly detailed, different, and difficult puzzles. This is challenge must be met if current PM
threats to the USG are to be effectively tracked, analyzed, and countered.
(IBPP Commentary: Even newer opportunities for PM operations exist via the globalization of security,
advances in information technology, the alleged reconfiguration of international politics along cultural
lines (Huntington, 1996,) and the ever more pervasiveness of television and other multimedia depictions
of alternate and altered realities (cf. Bloom, 1997; Gerbner, 1986.) PM will be perceived as even more
important by those who seek power. However, the PM challenge for the 21st century will be to adapt to
new technologies and new political, sociocultural, and psychological phenomena with the same timeless
concepts (cf. Liu Hsiang 1996/c. 20; Thucydides, 1954/c.401 B.C.) IBPP and its readership applaud Todd
Leventhal's analysis and clarion call.) (See Author. (Undated.) Cornerstones of information warfare.
Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force; Bloom, R. W. (1997.) Psychiatric applications of virtual
reality technology: Eden, Armageddon, or Bedlam? Paper to be presented at the International
Conference on Technology and the 21st Century. Cameron University, Lawton, OK; Gerbner, G., Gross,
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L., Morgan, M., & Signorelli, N. (1986.) Living with television: The dynamics of the cultivation process. In
J. Bryant & D. Zillman (Eds.) Perspectives on media effects. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; Huntington, S. (1996.)
The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. NY: Simon & Schuster.) (Keywords: Perception
management, information warfare.)
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